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2UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW
This article examines the rise of new forms of state preemption of local government 
legal authority in states across the nation, a trend that is prompting scholars, advocates, 
and officials to re-examine the underlying nature of home rule. The article lays out 
core components of a new approach to home rule that might remedy contemporary 
shortcomings in the doctrine, then reflects on lessons for reforming home rule from the 
Illinois experience.  
Home rule—a legal doctrine that defines the expanded authority of local 
governments—has grown and declined in public attention many times since 
Missouri became the first state to enshrine formal local government legal 
power in its state constitution in 1875. Now, a recent wave of state laws designed 
explicitly to constrain local governments across the country is prompting a re-
examination of the basic principles that should guide the state and local legal 
relationship. At this juncture, the Illinois experience has much to offer—and 
something to learn from—this national conversation. This article accordingly 
outlines the rise of what some scholars have called the “new preemption” 
(Briffault, 2018) and the need to modernize home rule in response. The article 
then reflects on how these national trends intersect with the doctrine of home 
rule and state and local relations in Illinois.
STATE PREEMPTION’S NEW LANDSCAPE 
Preemption is a well-established state legislative and judicial tool to mediate 
disputes between state and local governments if both a municipal government 
and the state legislature have adopted laws that arguably deal with the same 
subject matter. In many cases, state and local laws can coexist and apply 
concurrently, but in others, disputes arise that require a determination of 
whether the local law has been preempted by the state. For years, preemption 
has been used by state legislatures in two primary ways: either to displace 
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local policy with a statewide regulatory framework; or to establish general 
statewide minimum standards that are subject to local discretion to go beyond, 
to enhance, or to supplement those minimums. When conflicts arose over 
the interaction between state and local regulation, courts became the final 
arbiters of the preemption dispute. Shaped by regulatory context, the text of 
the relevant state and local laws, and the tradition of judicial involvement in 
preemption disputes, courts had to determine whether the state had explicitly 
preempted local laws; whether local laws conflicted with, were inconsistent 
with, or frustrated the purpose of state law; or whether state law “occupied the 
field” and left no room for concurrent local ordinances. 
Over the past decade, preemption has begun to take on a new form. State 
legislatures have passed laws expressly preempting local control—not for the 
purposes of adopting statewide policies or providing regulatory baselines, but 
merely to strip local governments of the power to act, leaving no regulatory 
structure in place. In this new use of an old doctrine, preemption has acquired 
a new deregulatory purpose, leaving local governments unable to address local 
problems.
In a growing number of states, preemption has become a series of narrow, 
targeted, and often partisan legislative actions that deny long-standing local 
powers, eroding the protection guaranteed to home rule by state constitutions. 
This new wave of preemption challenges the traditional understanding that 
home rule municipalities may frequently regulate and exercise local discretion 
to deal with problems in their own particular ways, without state approval or 
state authorization, and often in ways that the state would not choose to adopt 
at the state level. Policy experimentation and the ability to respond to unique 
local situations are essential aspects of a strong and vibrant home rule system. 
In many states, those essential features of local democracy are at risk. 
The State of Florida provides a good illustration of the new preemption. 
In recent years, the Florida legislature has passed laws prohibiting local 
regulation of smoking (Fla. Stat. § 386.209 et seq.), fire sprinklers (Fla. Stat. 
§ 553.73(17)), nutrition and food policy (Fla. Stat. § 509.032), the sale or use 
of polystyrene (Styrofoam) products (Fla. Stat. § 500.90), hoisting equipment 
(Fla. Stat. § 489.113), beekeeping (Fla. Stat. § 586.10), fuel terminals (Fla. Stat. 
§ 163.3206(3)), wireless alarm systems (Fla. Stat. § 553.793), minimum wage, 
paid sick leave and other employment benefits, such as vacation time (Fla. Stat. 
§ 218.077), firearms (Fla. Stat. § 790.33), moving companies (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
507.13), sanctuary city policies (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 908.103), biomedical waste 
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in city landfills (Fla. Stat. § 381.0098(8)), plastic bags (Fla. Stat. § 403.7033), 
and even of milk and frozen desserts (Fla. Stat. § 502.232). Each of these laws 
is a targeted removal of a specific home rule power and part of no general 
statewide program other than perhaps a general statewide effort to undermine 
home rule. The state response to local action reflects deep partisan divides 
in our country, and with this polarization has come local disempowerment, 
even though that disempowerment is frequently in direct conflict with state 
constitutional protection of broad home rule powers. 
As the new deregulatory preemption has accelerated, state legislatures whose 
policy preferences conflict sharply with their local governments, particularly 
large cities, have begun to use their preemptive authority in a more strident 
manner. Moving beyond the “strip one power at a time” approach to dismantling 
home rule, legislatures are considering expansive blanket preemption bills, 
erasing broad swaths of local legislative powers with one stroke of the pen. 
The Michigan legislature, for instance, in the “Local Government Labor 
Regulatory Limitation Act of 2015” (colloquially known as the “Death Star 
Act”), preempted all local regulation “of the employment relationship between 
a nonpublic employer and its employees.” Other states have considered, but 
not yet passed, even broader blanket preemption laws. In 2017, for instance, 
the Florida legislature considered HB 17, which would have prohibited all 
local regulation of “a business, profession, or occupation.” Oklahoma’s SB 1289 
would have effectively repealed home rule by legislative fiat, with language that 
denied municipal power to act “unless expressly authorized by statute.” During 
their most recently concluded legislative sessions, Florida’s HB 3 would have 
imposed sweeping and severe limitations on the ability of local governments 
to pass laws regulating businesses, and Texas’ HB 3899 would have prohibited 
any municipality from imposing a restriction, condition, or regulation on 
commercial activity. Previously introduced legislation in Texas would have 
preempted “all local regulation of the use of private property, all local authority 
over any activity licensed by the state, and any local law setting higher standards 
than state law on the same subject” (Briffault, 2018, p. 2008). Texas’ Governor 
Abbott has been quoted saying that the state should adopt a “ban across the 
board on municipal regulations” (Briffault, 2018, p. 2008). 
In addition to the removal of local powers in ways that leave regulatory concerns 
unaddressed at any level of government is the phenomenon of punitive 
preemption that has recently emerged. Some state legislatures have adopted 
measures that go beyond invalidating local laws deemed unacceptable by state 
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officials. These laws are designed to intimidate local officials; prevent local 
policy debate; and even punish local officials, either personally by penalizing 
(even criminalizing) certain local votes, or by depriving local governments 
of state revenue-sharing in retaliation for certain local legislative actions. A 
few of the most egregious examples include a Texas law allowing that local 
officials who refuse to cooperate with federal immigration officials can be 
removed from office, jailed, and fined up to $25,000 a day (Texas Gov’t Code 
§ 725.0565, § 752.056; Texas Penal Code § 39.07), an Arizona law threatening 
local governments with loss of state revenue-sharing funds for adoption of 
any local law deemed preempted by the attorney general (A.R.S. § 41-194.01), 
and a Florida law that punishes local officials who “violate the Legislature’s 
occupation of the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition” 
with removal from office, imposition of civil fines, and personal liability up 
to $100,000 in damages to successful private plaintiffs who challenge the local 
government’s actions (Fla. Stat. § 790.33). Though state and local relations have 
never been free from conflict, basic principles of judicial review and separation 
of powers have long provided clear and well-established avenues to resolve 
these disputes in court. There is no evidence to suggest that local governments 
have ever defied a judicial declaration of state preemption. State threats of civil 
and criminal penalties, and the decision to authorize executive officials to take 
what is essentially judicial action, seem to serve no purpose other than to chill 
local action and intimidate local officials. 
In legal challenges to this novel state reordering of home rule power, municipal 
officials, local citizens, and advocacy groups have responded with a variety of 
legal strategies and doctrines. State-specific doctrines, such as bans on special 
legislation, constitutional uniformity requirements, and single-subject rules 
have been invoked to invalidate some state attempts to preempt. Other broader 
state constitutional principles, such as separation of powers or legislative 
immunity may also become part of the local governments’ resistance to state 
intrusion. In other cases, the precise constitutional language in the home 
rule provisions may offer grounds for a challenge as does, for instance, the 
requirement in many state constitutional home rule provisions that home rule 
initiatives are subject to “general laws.” In Ohio, that “general laws” provision 
has been interpreted as a limitation on preemption power, with the Ohio courts 
invalidating state laws that seek to do nothing other than remove local powers 
to act.1 As state limitations on home rule powers deepen, local governments 
may also raise the basic and overarching argument that at some point, state 
preemption of home rule powers exceeds the proper bounds of the preemption 
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power and has become an abuse of that power, attempting to do indirectly what 
the state cannot do directly. 
THREE CASE STUDIES
1.  Bisbee, Arizona plastic bag ordinance 
An example of the new preemption paradigm comes from Arizona. In 2012, the City of Bisbee, Arizona 
passed an ordinance that banned the use of plastic bags by retailers. In 2016, the Arizona legislature 
passed HB 2131, which prohibited local governments from regulating plastic bags.
After HB 2131 passed, a Republican state senator requested that the Arizona attorney general investigate 
Bisbee’s ordinance for a possible conflict. Under an Arizona law referred to as SB 1487, any member of the 
Arizona legislature can request that the attorney general investigate local ordinances for preemption. If the 
ordinance is found to be preempted, the municipality has 30 days to remedy the violation before the state 
treasurer begins withholding state money from the municipality. 
The Arizona Attorney General found Bisbee’s ordinance to violate HB 2131. To avoid losing almost one 
quarter of its annual revenue, Bisbee was forced to amend the ordinance to make participation voluntary. 
As of July 2019, there have been 12 Arizona SB 1487 investigations, with three ordinances declared in 
violation of state preemptive statutes. 
2.   Rideshare companies seeking to avoid local regulation by going to the state 
legislature
A common rationale for preemption is “uniformity,” but this interest can also be undergirded by rent-
seeking behavior. In the case of the ridesharing industry, companies such as Uber and Lyft are lobbying for 
state preemption of the livery industry (e.g., cabs, limousines). Historically, livery industry regulation has 
been largely local. 
Currently, 49 states have statewide ridesharing regulations. Many of these bills preempt all local regulation 
of ridesharing. However, several states have created exceptions for major cities, such as New York City. 
Some states winnow this exception further by attaching an expiration date to local authority. For example, 
Vermont’s 2018 ridesharing bill grants Burlington regulatory authority only until 2020. 
These statutes tend to create an uneven playing field by only removing ridesharing from local jurisdiction. 
This leaves traditional livery companies subject to existing, often comprehensive, local regulations while 
ridesharing companies are subject to lighter state regulations. 
3.  State Preemption of Airbnb
Regulating short-term property rental companies, such as Airbnb, is another area in which state governments 
are increasingly seeking to preempt local authority on a uniformity rationale. These efforts are in the 
early stages, with various approaches being taken to regulation. Several states, including Arizona, Florida, 
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RETHINKING HOME RULE
Tensions evident in the current landscape of state and local relations provide 
a timely opportunity to ask what a more constructive vision of home rule 
might look like today. For nearly 150 years—since Missouri’s adoption of 
constitutional home rule in 1875 and the St. Louis city charter that followed 
that innovation—home rule has evolved and developed to meet changing 
needs. The last comprehensive effort to reimagine home rule came in the 
1953 Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule, drafted by 
Jefferson B. Fordham, who was then the Dean of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, and published by the American Municipal Association (AMA), 
which is now known as the National League of Cities. 
The Fordham/AMA model sought to remedy the fundamental flaw in earlier 
models of constitutional home rule (still in force in many states) that the 
judiciary by necessity became heavily involved in both the determination of 
the scope of local powers and the resolution of disputes over whether local 
laws are inconsistent with or frustrate the purpose of a state law, even if that 
state statute contains no explicitly preemptive language. In that system, imperio 
home rule reflected the idea that a home rule municipality was imperium in 
imperio (an empire within an empire).2 Home rule units of government had 
some immunity from legislative preemption when the issue at hand was 
deemed to be exclusively local. Because many state judges defined the scope 
of “local affairs” or “municipal issues” very narrowly, local laws were often 
invalidated as being beyond the scope of home rule powers. That shortcoming 
was a key impetus for the Fordham/AMA model. The wave of home rule reform 
it inspired removed the judiciary’s extensive involvement in drawing the line 
Tennessee, and Wisconsin, prevent local authorities from completely banning short-term rentals. Other 
states have taken aim at the industry, with New York banning rentals of non-owner-occupied apartments for 
periods of less than 30 days. Yet other states seek to empower local governments, with Virginia authorizing 
localities to create registration requirements for short-term rentals. Finally, some companies have taken the 
initiative and voluntarily entered contracts with state revenue departments to remit taxes owed on rental 
transactions. 
Additionally, there are numerous proposed bills that outline the regulatory paths states might take. Some 
measures are relatively tame, such as HB 4841 in Massachusetts, which would have created a statewide 
registry of short-term rental properties. Others are aggressive “new preemption” statutes such as HB 987, 
a failed bill from the latest session of the Florida legislature, which would invalidate all local regulations of 
short-term rentals. 
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between state and local matters—after all, most issues involve some mix of 
local and state interests. In exchange for this substantial reduction in judicial 
involvement, the model established broad local initiative authority combined 
with essentially unconstrained state preemption authority.
Although the Fordham/AMA model was innovative for its time, much has 
changed about the nature and role of local governments in our federal system 
since its publication in 1953. Local governments have always provided many 
important public services, including education and public safety. But cities, 
counties, and other local governments have increasingly become dynamic 
sources of policy innovation in recent decades, tackling issues as disparate as 
climate change, economic opportunity, racial and gender equity, public health, 
and the impacts of new technology. And, at a time of political polarization and 
gridlock, people still place faith in the ability of their local governments to be 
pragmatic problem-solving institutions. 
How should home rule be re-envisioned to protect the crucial role that cities 
and other local governments are now playing at the forefront of governance? 
One starting point would be that local governments should—at least as a 
default matter—carry the full range of policymaking authority they need to 
meet the challenges they face. What local government scholars often call the 
initiative power in home rule was central to the Fordham/AMA model in 1953. 
Unfortunately, that fundamental premise has not been consistently respected 
by state courts; as a result, courts spend too much time adjudicating the 
boundaries of what is appropriate for local action. Not all local communities 
will need to exercise every tool in the policy toolkit, but there should be a clear 
reason why any local government would be denied the ability to act in any 
given instance.
In terms of the power to make policy, a particularly important aspect of home 
rule involves municipal finance. Over the past generation, local governments 
have been frustrated in their attempts to raise revenue sufficient to meet the 
needs of their constituents. State-imposed limitations on local taxation, state 
restrictions on local fees, and other constraints imposed either by statute or 
through judicial decision, have combined to severely limit municipal fiscal 
powers. Those limitations are further compounded by frequent state imposition 
of mandates for local spending without corresponding rises in local revenue 
capacity.
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Home rule should thus presumptively include the ability for local governments 
to structure their finances. There are legitimate state interests in fiscal 
uniformity and coordination, to be sure, but those interests should be manifest 
when states intervene. Indeed, given the importance of finance to all of the 
work of local governance, some commentators have even argued that it would 
be appropriate in a system of home rule for states to take an active role in 
ensuring a minimum baseline of fiscal resources across the widely varying 
capacity of local governments, so that every community can meet at least the 
most basic needs of its residents (Briffault, 2004, p. 270–271). 
Similarly critical is a recognition that states should be particularly cautious in 
directly interfering with the workings of local democracy. How communities 
choose to structure and operate their own governance is at the heart of home 
rule, and the rise of punitive preemption runs counter to the very reason we 
have local governments. It is one thing for states to displace local policymaking 
if they have good reason but taking the additional step of punishing local 
governments and local officials in policy disputes should not be part of any 
system of home rule.
A renewed commitment to the ability of cities and other local governments to 
make policy, structure local finances, and govern themselves requires rethinking 
of how states shape local autonomy—what legal scholars call the immunity 
function of home rule. The Fordham/AMA approach of granting broad local 
initiative while removing local immunity from preemption worked until the 
current new preemption wave made clear that states were not exercising their 
oversight as the model contemplated. Contemporary home rule, then, should 
recalibrate, requiring states to have—and to articulate clearly—a good reason 
to remove or limit local authority. There are many such reasons, including 
addressing problems that require regional or statewide solutions, or ensuring 
that the floor for particular rights or regulatory interests is maintained across 
a state. But state lawmakers should not be able to declare without any judicial 
scrutiny that the state prevails in mere policy disagreements with local 
governments.
Protecting local autonomy does not deprive states of their ability to establish 
uniform standards that reflect important state policies or to prohibit local 
regulation that comes with unacceptable extraterritorial impacts. Few would 
argue, for example, that local laws should be able to undercut state minimum 
wage laws, laws that reflect the state’s considered decision that all workers earn 
at least the amount adopted by statute. Similarly, local laws that would change, 
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for instance, a state’s system of comparative or contributory negligence in tort 
within one particular locality would never survive a legal challenge because of 
the unacceptable disruption this change would cause statewide. When limited 
to ensuring compliance with important state policies or laws, preemption is 
an important tool in establishing the balance of state and local relations. But 
when used simply to strip local governments of the ability to respond to their 
particular social, geographic, and demographic realities by creating regulatory 
vacuums, preemption undercuts the democratic process and denies the very 
essence of the home rule system. 
Under this approach to home rule, in short, states and local governments can 
be—indeed, should be—partners in governance. That partnership requires 
mutual respect and a recognition that each level of government has a vital role 
to play. But it also takes a formal legal underpinning for local authority that 
recognizes the importance of local democracy and places responsibility on 
state governments when displacing that local democracy.
LESSONS FOR—AND FROM—ILLINOIS
Illinois municipalities and their officials have long enjoyed a state home rule 
system in which the state legislature and judiciary have generally respected the 
constitutional drafters’ intent to protect broad local initiative powers from state 
meddling and micromanagement. Because home rule did not come to Illinois 
until the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the constitutional drafters 
had many examples of home rule successes and failures to guide their choices. 
They opted for a home rule system based on the Fordham/AMA model, 
meaning that in Illinois, the constitutional grand bargain coupled extremely 
broad local initiative home rule powers with equally broad legislative powers to 
preempt, as opposed to the older, flawed imperio approach of trying to protect 
some indeterminate core local sphere from preemption. 
Illinois’ constitutional drafters were particularly careful to establish the 
contours of home rule powers and the relationship between home rule units 
and the state legislature. Article VII, Section 6’s grant of regulatory power is 
broad, and the constitution explicitly states that “a home rule unit may exercise 
any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs 
including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the 
public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt” 
(Ill. Const. art. VII § 6(a)). To stress the breadth of that power and the expected 
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judicial restraint, the home rule article ends with the directive that “powers and 
functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally” (Ill. Const. art. VII 
§ 6(m)). Moreover, the state’s constitution establishes that concurrent exercise 
of power at the state and local levels is unremarkable and is to be expected (Ill. 
Const. art. VII § 6(i)).
However, Illinois’ grant of broad local home rule power, along with the 
expectation of harmonious concurrent state and local regulatory schemes, is 
not absolute. If the legislature chooses to establish exclusive state regulatory 
power in a certain area, it may preempt local power if it “provide[s] specifically 
by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home 
rule unit” (Ill. Const. art. VII § 6(h)). If the local laws being preempted are in 
an area that the state has not yet regulated, a three-fifths majority is required to 
preempt the local law (Ill. Const. art. VII § 6(g)).3 
To date, the Illinois General Assembly has not taken excessive actions that 
fall within the new preemption. In most cases, it continues to respect home 
rule authority and to use its preemption powers judiciously. Home rule and 
preemption have coexisted relatively peacefully in the nearly five decades since 
the adoption of the Illinois Constitution. Home rule powers have been given 
a wide berth, and local governments enjoy the discretion and flexibility to 
respond to many particularly local problems in ways that would not have been 
possible prior to the adoption of home rule. This is due less to the structure and 
text of the Illinois Constitution’s home rule article and more to two important 
facts. First, the Illinois courts have generally respected the constitution’s 
unenforceable directive to exercise restraint in their use of preemption doctrines 
to invalidate local laws. Second, the Illinois legislature has acknowledged the 
benefits that home rule brings to the people and communities of Illinois: a 
decentralized level of government closest to the people; opportunity for local 
experimentation without locking in statewide uniformity; and a system that 
understands that the distinct and substantial differences among rural Illinois, 
suburban Illinois, and the City of Chicago require different and individualized 
local responses to local problems.
Although the Illinois legislature has been generally unwilling to join other 
state legislatures that have been significantly curtailing home rule, the growing 
volume of proposed legislation with traces of preemption and other recent 
examples suggest that the General Assembly may not be immune from the 
temptation to squelch local powers, either with a narrow, targeted deregulatory 
preemption statute or with a preemption law that imposes punitive consequences 
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on local officials who pass local laws that conflict with the state’s preemption. 
In 2018, for instance, an early version of the law banning local right-to-work 
ordinances made local legislators’ violation of the state’s preemption a Class A 
misdemeanor (SB 1474, 2019). Ultimately, that punitive provision was dropped 
as the bill progressed. To date, there have been no new attempts to penalize 
local governments whose officials disagree with state policies in Illinois.
Turning to the judicial branch, the attitude toward home rule is similar. For 
the most part, Illinois courts have shown the same deference and restraint as 
the legislature. Since it would be unrealistic to expect a perfect consistency 
in judicial interpretation, however, it is not surprising to find some judicial 
deviation from the state’s well-established norms of deference to home rule 
(City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 2012). In that case, the majority of the court 
reached the surprising conclusion that although Chicago clearly had home rule 
authority to levy an amusement tax on tickets sold in Chicago, it had no power 
to require online ticket brokers to collect that tax. Over a strenuous dissent, the 
court held that the ordinance exceeded the bounds of home rule power because 
it did not “pertain to” the city’s affairs. The state’s comprehensive regulation in 
that field, the majority concluded, meant that the entire area of ticket sales had 
become an exclusive statewide concern. 
Though the court’s analysis used § 6(a) as its doctrinal basis to conclude that 
the local ordinance did not pertain to Chicago’s affairs, it is in reality nothing 
more than a backdoor return to the doctrine of implied preemption, with 
shades of an “occupation of the field” analysis. As the dissent correctly noted, 
however, a consistent line of Illinois cases has repeatedly rejected the argument 
that the Illinois Constitution’s home rule provisions envision any role for 
implied preemption analyses.4 Although StubHub sounded the alarm in many 
local government offices and chambers just one year later in Palm v. 2800 Lake 
Shore Drive Condominium (2013), the court appeared to return to its pre-
StubHub mode of analysis and concluded that Chicago’s ordinance regulating 
condominiums was a valid exercise of home rule authority in spite of extensive, 
and less restrictive, state statutory law. Reiterating its longstanding position 
that the legislature’s preemption of home rule authority must be express, the 
Palm opinion seems to relegate StubHub to a position of relative unimportance 
in Illinois home rule analysis. Since the Palm decision, although the Illinois 
Supreme Court has not considered home rule, lower court opinions have 
focused more on Palm than on StubHub (Midwest Gaming and Entertainment 
LLC v. County of Cook, 2015; Ill. Coin Mach. Operators Ass’n v. County of Cook, 
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2015; Youngbert v. Village of Round Lake Beach, 2017; Accel Entertainment 
Gaming, LLC v. Village of Elmwood Park, 2015). In these cases, the Illinois 
Appellate Court has rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to invalidate local ordinances, 
refusing to apply StubHub and focusing more on Palm and the pre-StubHub 
jurisprudence. Three of those pro-home rule appellate court decisions were 
appealed; the Illinois Supreme Court denied review in all three. In sum, despite 
what appear to be some outliers, Illinois municipalities continue to enjoy 
expansive local initiative powers, subject to state legislative oversight that has 
been measured. 
CONCLUSION
As the momentum grows for a nationwide re-examination of home rule, officials 
in Illinois will have an opportunity to consider whether the constitutional 
home rule provisions in the state would benefit from revision. For the most 
part, the state legislature and state judiciary have respected the constitutional 
drafters’ intent that home rule powers be broad and subject to minimal judicial 
and legislative interference. The stability of home rule in Illinois has produced 
a system with flourishing local initiative powers tempered with more limited 
preemptive interference, either by the legislature or the judiciary, than is 
typical in many Fordham/AMA model home rule states. True, there has been 
a legislative proposal for punitive preemption provisions, and one surprising 
judicial departure from established legal doctrine. It is also true that Illinois 
local government officials must be vigilant to fight back against possible 
expansion of StubHub’s precedential weight, and should speak in one voice 
to oppose any legislative proposals that impose penalties or other punitive 
consequences on local government actions. But in comparison to other states, 
those intrusions on home rule are minimal. The question for Illinois will be 
whether constitutional amendments could produce even stronger and more 
certain home rule powers, or whether prudential caution leads to the decision 
to leave well enough alone. 
Nestor M. Davidson is the Albert A. Walsh Professor of Real Estate, Land Use, 
and Property Law at the Fordham University School of Law, where he also 
serves as the faculty director of Fordham’s Urban Law Center. Laurie Reynolds is 
the Prentice H. Marshall Professor Emerita at the University of Illinois.
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ENDNOTES
1 The Ohio courts define general laws as “statutes setting forth police, sanitary, or similar 
regulations and not statutes which purport only to grant or to limit the legislative powers of a 
municipal corporation to adopt or enforce police, sanitary or other similar regulations” (Village 
of West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1965; City of Canton v. State, 2002). 
2 The language comes from a Supreme Court opinion involving Missouri’s home rule provision, 
with the imperio language referring to St. Louis (St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 1893). 
3 Ill. Const. art. VII, § 6(g)–(l) for the enumeration of specific limits on the legislature’s powers of 
preemption. Those provisions deal with legislative preemption of local taxing power, local debt 
limits, special assessments, and special service-area taxes. 
4 Further support against implied preemption is found in the Home Rule Note Act, which 
provides that “[e]very bill that denies or limits any power or function of a home rule unit shall 
have . . . a brief explanatory note that includes a reliable estimate of the probable impact of the bill 
on the powers and functions of home rule units” (Home Rule Note Act of 2010). The law further 
provides that: “No law . . . denies or limits any power or function of a home rule unit, pursuant 
to paragraphs (g), (h), (i), (j) or (k) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution, unless 
there is specific language limiting or denying the power or function and the language that 
specifically sets forth in what manner and to what extent it is a limitation on or denial of the 
power or function of a home rule unit.” (Home Rule Note Act of 2010). If no home rule note is 
attached to a piece of legislation, the only plausible interpretation is that the legislature does not 
intend to preempt home rule powers. 
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